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of ILA activities.
In summary, the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's Association4 signifies that
petitions by the Board for temporary injunctive relief pursuant to section
10(l) of the NLRA are to be favorably received by the district courts.
District court denials of injunctive relief will be reversed by the circuit
court unless the Board patently lacks "reasonable cause to believe" that
the charged unfair labor practices are true." Moreover, the narrow view of
the work preservation doctrine evident in previous decisions by the Fourth
Circuit 6 continues. Whenever a traditional work function is displaced to
some extent by technological innovations and the employees performing
that function do not seasonably assert their claim to the work through a
valid work preservation clause, the work will be held to be no longer within
the traditional work of the employees. Further, efforts to reacquire that lost
portion will be held to be unlawful work acquisition measures prohibited





The amount of the estate tax liability of a married decedent's estate'
may be reduced through the marital deduction allowed the surviving
spouse. 2 This deduction allows the executor to reduce the taxable value of
the estate by deducting from the estate all property that passed from the
decedent to the spouse.' When used to its fullest extent, the marital deduc-
" 548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 497-98.
See, e.g., George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1973).
I.R.C. § 2001 provides for the taxation of a decedent's estate.
2 I.R.C. § 2056. The value of the decedent's gross estate includes the value of all of the
decedent's property, real or personal, tangible or intangible. I.R.C. § 2031(a). The value of
the decedent's taxable estate is determined by deducting from the decedent's gross estate the
exemptions and deductions provided for in §§ 2052 through 2056. I.R.C. § 2051. Included
among the deductions is the marital deduction of an amount equal to the value of any interest
in property which passes from the decedent to the surviving spouse. I.R.C. § 2056(a).
• The marital deduction is a device intended to equalize the effect of federal estate taxes
in community property and common-law property jurisdictions by allowing spouses in
common-law jurisdictions to share the tax burden on the property owned by both individuals.
S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1163, 1188; see United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963); C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J.
McCOND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 17.1 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
LOWNDES]; 4 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 29.01 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as MERTENS-ESTATE]; Anderson, The Marital Deduction and Equalization
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tion reduces the taxable value of the decedent's estate by fifty percent.'
Before the marital deduction provision is applied, however, an absolute or
non-terminable interest in the property must pass from the decedent to the
spouse. ' The non-terminable interest requirement insures that property
exempt from tax liability in the decedent's estate under the marital deduc-
tion will be controlled by the spouse at her death and taxable as a part of
the spouse's estate at that time.6
The definitional requirements of a terminable interest have been a
source of litigation since the establishment of the marital deduction in
Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and Community Property
States, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1087 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Anderson]; Baker, The Marital
Deduction and the Terminable Interest Rule, 40 TENN. L. REv. 195 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Bakeri; Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 1097, 1156 (1948). In community property jurisdictions the holdings of a married couple
which were acquired during the marriage are attributed in equal, shares to each spouse. Poe
v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 (1930). When one of the married couple dies, the decedent's
estate only includes one-half of the couple's holdings. Id. The remaining one-half is owned
by the spouse and does not pass through the decedent's estate. The estate tax is, therefore,
limited to one-half of the couple's property. In common-law jurisdictions, however, the total
value of such property is considered to be in the estate of the spouse who held title. Since
title to all of the couple's property was in the decedent, all of the property would have passed
through the estate and been subject to taxation. See Baker, supra at 195. The marital deduc-
tion allows the estate to treat one-half of the decedent's property as if it was owned by the
spouse so that the property is not taxed as a part of the decedent's estate. By allowing the
deduction of the property passing to the spouse from the value of the decedent's gross estate,
taxpayers are treated more equally than they had been under the property laws of the respec-
tive states. Id.; see LOWNDES, supra, at § 17.2; MaRTENS-ESTATE, supra, at § 29.57. For an
explanation of what interests may be included under the marital deduction provision see note
5 infra.
The maximum amount deductable under I.R.C. § 2056(a) is fifty percent of the ad-
justed gross estate. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1).
No deduction is allowed for interests that will terminate or fail because of a lapse of
time, the occurrence of an event or contingency, or the failure of an event or contingency to
occur. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1). This provision was included in the legislation to further insure
equal tax treatment of community property and common-law jurisdictions. In community
property jurisdictions the spouse receives absolute ownership of one-half of the community
property. Consequently, to achieve equal treatment the terminable interest rule requires the
decedent to pass to the spouse all interest in the property. See United States v. Stapf, 375
U.S. 118, 128 (1963); S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in [19481 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1163, 1190; Anderson, supra note 3, at 1101; Baker, supra note 3, at
196; Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax Equalization-The Marital Deducation, 36 CAL. L. REV.
223, 230 (1948). The terminable interest rule prevents the testator from bequeathing the
spouse a limited interest in avoidance of estate tax at his death which, in turn, would avoid
estate tax on the property or the equivalent in the spouse's estate if the limited interest would
fail prior to her death. See Allen v. United States, 359 F.2d 151, 154 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 832 (1966).
Postponement of the payment of the tax through the marital deduction is intended to
subject the property of the marital community to an estate tax only once in the estate of either
spouse. Reilly v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 797, 799 (3d Cir. 1957). To insure that the property
or the equivalent will eventually be taxable in the surviving spouse's estate, the testator must
convey an absolute interest in the property to the spouse. See note 5 supra.
1978]
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1948. 7 The Fourth Circuit recently decided whether the value of a gift in a
will provision was deductible under the marital deduction. The provision
allowed the decedent's spouse either to take sufficient property under the
will to maximize the marital deduction allowed the estate or to reject the
bequest and allow the property to pass into a residuary trust. In Estate of
Mackie v. Commissioner,' the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had denied
the marital deduction sought by the executrix of the decedent's estate9 and
determined that there was a corresponding deficiency'0 in the amount of
the estate tax paid. The will gave the spouse a right to accept or reject the
bequest, and provided that if the spouse did not affirmatively elect to take
under the will within four months, the marital share would be assumed to
have been rejected." The IRS argued that because the bequest could lapse
through non-acceptance, the bequest was a non-deductible terminable in-
terest under section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.)." After
paying the additional estate taxes, the executrix of the estate sued in the
Tax Court to recover the amount.' 3 The Tax Court held that the property
passed through the election provision of the will and, therefore, was includ-
7 See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964); Virginia Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 443 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1971); Estate of Green v. United States, 441 F.2d 303 (6th
Cir. 1971); Allen v. United States, 359 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1966); First Nat'l Exchange Bank v.
United States, 335 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1964).
545 F.2d 883 (4th Cir. 1976).
The interest the IRS alleged was terminable in the Mackie will was bequeathed under
clauses stating the testator's intent to maximize the deduction, giving the spouse all of the
property selected, giving the spouse the right to accept or reject the bequest, and providing
that if the spouse did not affirmatively elect to take under the will within four months, the
marital share would be assumed to have been rejected. Id. at 884. See generally, Barnes, New
Tax Court Decisions Broaden Estate Tax Planning Potential of Marital Deduction, 45 J. TAX.
292, 293 (1976). The will also provided that if the spouse's bequest was rejected, the proceeds
would pass into a residuary trust which would distribute the income to the spouse and
children of their marriage. The children retained a remainder interest in the trust. 545 F.2d
at 884.
10 Notice must be given by the IRS to the taxpayer of a tax deficiency assessment. I.R.C.
§ 6212. The taxpayer then has ninety days from the notice's mailing date to petition the Tax
Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. I.R.C. § 6213(a). Until the appeal time has
expired, the IRS is barred from levying on 'the deficiency. Id.
" 545 F.2d at 884.
2 For the definition of a terminable interest see note 5 supra.
13 A taxpayer may contest the assessment of a deficiency through administrative proce-
dure established by the Internal Revenue Service. After the assessment is determined, the
taxpayer may appeal the decision to the Audit Division in his District Office and ultimately
to the Appellate Division Conference. J. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §
295 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CHOMMIE]. If an agreement is not reached within the admin-
istrative process, judicial relief is possible. Id. at § 296. The taxpayer may petition the United
States Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. See I.R.C. § 6213(a). See generally
9 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 50.01-.119 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as MERTENS-INCOME]. Alternatively, the taxpayer may elect to pay the tax, file a refund
claim, and if the refund is not paid sue the United States in either federal district court or
the United States Court of Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1970); CHOMMIE, supra, at §
296. See generally 10 MERTENS-INCOME, supra, at §§ 58A.19, .25-.26.
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able in the estate marital deduction.'4 The IRS appealed.'5
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision and held that
because the spouse could elect to take an absolute interest in the property
under the will at the time of the decedent's death'" the interest, once
accepted, was non-terminable and, therefore, qualified for the marital de-
duction.'7 The court reasoned that the provision of the will requiring formal
acceptance of the bequest was not a bar to the deduction because the
acceptance provision put the spouse in the same position as a disinherited
spouse with a statutory right of election against the will.'" Because the
spouse's interest was non-terminable,"' the court held the executrix should
be permitted to include the property passing under the provision as a part
of the marital deduction.
2 0
The Fourth Circuit analogized the spouse's right of election created by
the will to a spouse's statutory right of election against a will.2' Where a
statutory right of election exists, a spouse is allowed to elect between the
bequest under the will or the spouse's share established by statute.2 2 The
will in Mackie allowed the spouse to elect either the bequest of one-half of
the decedent's property, or the interest provided in the residuary trust.Y
Both situations require an acceptance by the spouse of the alternative
disposition of the decedent's property and allow the spouse to determine
under which alternative the decedent's estate will be settled. Whatever
interest chosen, however, would vest absolutely in the surviving spouse.
Under section 2056(b) terminable interests are non-deductible under
the marital deduction if the interest will pass from the decedent to any
beneficiary other than the surviving spouse after the spouse's interest
failed. 2 Bequests that are contingent upon the occurrence2 or nonoccurr-
,A Estate of Mackie v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 308, 314 (1975).
545 F.2d at 884.
" Id. The determination of whether an interest is terminable is made as of the time of
the decedent's death. The interest is not terminable if at that time the spouse's interest is
absolute and not subject to any contingencies. See Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503,
508 (1964) (widow's allowance was terminable; interest conditioned on widow not dying or
remarrying); First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. United States, 335 F.2d 91, 93 (4th Cir. 1964)
(widow's alternative rights to take under decedent's will or renouce will and claim dower
vested at time of decedent's death); Estate of Ray v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1171, 1174 (1970)
(spouse's bequest was contingent because spouse required to execute an agreement). Compare
LOWNDES, supra note 3, at § 17.5 and MERTENS-ESTATE, supra note 3, at § 29.23 with 22 Sw.
L. J. 548 (1968).
' 545 F.2d at 884.
" Id. Mackie died testate in North Carolina and under applicable state law a spouse
could reject a deceased spouse's will whenever the share is less than the spouse's intestate
share. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1976).
" 545 F.2d at 884.
2 Id.
21 Id.
2 See note 18 supra.
21 For a summary of the provisions in decedent's will see note 9 supra.
21 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1). Section 2056 provides for exceptions to the terminable interest rule
in cases where the spouse's interest is conditional on survival for at least six months, where
19781
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ence26 of a subsequent act, or which are limited in duration 7 are terminable
interests under section 2056(b) .2 In contrast, however, the interest the
spouse received under the decedent's will in Mackie was not a terminable
interest since the spouse obtained absolute ownership after the election
was made.29 The issue in Mackie was whether the acceptance provision in
the will rendered the spouse's otherwise absolute interest in the bequest a
non-deductible terminable interest.
The IRS formerly refused to allow deduction from the gross estate of
any property which required formal acceptance. The deduction of a
widow's statutory allowance was upheld in Estate of Rensenhouse v.
Commissioner,3" although after election of the allowance, the spouse was
required by statute to petition the appropriate probate court. The IRS
argued that because the spouse might fail to petition the court, the allow-
ance was terminable and not properly in the marital deduction .3 In
Rensenhouse the Tax Court refused to characterize the requirement that
acceptance be made through proper legal procedures as a contingency to
the existance of the right that would establish the statutory interest as
terminable. 32 Subsequently in Revenue Ruling 76-166,3 the IRS conceded
that absolute interests created by state law were not terminable merely
because formal legal action was required to effect their acceptance.34
The rule that absolute interests are not terminable for the sole reason
the spouse takes a life estate with a power of appointment, or where the spouse takes proceeds
under the decedent's life insurance policy with a power of appointment over payments. I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(3), (5), (6). See generally S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-18 (Part 2),
reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1163, 1237-40.
2 See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 359 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1966) (bequest conditional on
execution of arrangement to devise property); Estate of Ray v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1171
(1970) (bequest contingent on reciprocal devise).
26 See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964) (allowance contingent on
widow not remarrying); Brown v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,887 (bequest contin-
gent on spouse not remarrying).
2 See, e.g., Sutton v. Commissioner, 535 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1974) (payment fund for life
is terminable interest); Estate of Neugass v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 188 (1975) (life estate in
decedent's art collection is terminable interest).
" The terminable interest rule was intended to encompass a wide variety of contingent
interests provided for in wills. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (Part 2), reprinted in
[1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 1163, 1229. For a discussion of terminable interests
see note 5 supra.
545 F.2d at 884.
30 31 T.C. 818 (1959).
31 Id. at 820-21.
12 Id. at 821.
3 1976-1 C.B. 287.
31 Id. Revenue Ruling 76-166 dealt with an Arizona homestead and exempt property
allowance which was in addition to any property passing to the spouse either by intestate
succession, or by the decedent's will. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 14-2401, -2402 (Supp. 1977).
The allowance required the spouse to survive the decedent by 120 hours and elect to accept
the allowance. The Commissioner ruled that such requirements did not impose any substan-
tial conditions which would alter the spouse's right to the allowance and, therefore, the
allowance was includable in the estate marital deduction. 1976-1 C.B. 287, 288.
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that positive action is required for acceptance, applies equally to statu-
tory' 5 and testamentary interests. 38 Both involve absolute interests predi-
cated on acceptance by the elector. In either case the view of the accept-
ance requirement as a contingency would bar the application of the estate
marital deduction to the interest.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Mackie was based on the analogy
drawn between a spouse's statutory right of election against a will and the
spouse's right of election created by the Mackie will. The analogy was
proper in light of the elections' factual similarity, the IRS's prior position
on each election, and the legislative history and policy behind the marital
deduction.
On a factual basis, the two elections are similar. In each the spouse is
given an absolute interest in the particular property at the moment of the
decedent's death,3 and under either statute or will, the interest must be
accepted by the spouse before the transfer is completed.
3
1
The IRS's previous position provides authority for the election anal-
ogy."9 Revenue Ruling 76-166 established that an absolute interest created
by state law was not terminable because a formal act of acceptance was
required. A similar position has also been applied by the Fourth Circuit
to will created interests in cases holding that a legatee's acceptance was
not a contingency which would bar the application of the legacy to the
marital deduction.40
Finally, the change in position taken by the IRS in ruling the accept-
ance provision in Mackie caused the spouse's interest to be terminable has
no statutory or historical basis. 4iThe definition of a terminable interest is
3 See, e.g., Estate of Rensenhouse v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 818 (1959); Rev. Rul. 76-
166, 1976-1 C.B. 287.
3' See Guiney v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 789 (D. Md. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
425 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1970). Guiney involved a testator who had established a marital trust
and then granted by will to his spouse a general power of appointment through which the
spouse could by written demand receive $3,000 per year from the trust. Although the court
ruled that the trust was improperly established and, thus, terminable, the IRS conceded that
the spouse had an absolute right to demand the first $3,000 on the death of the testator. 295
F. Supp. at 797. The executor was accordingly allowed to apply the absolute interest received
from the testator to the estate marital deduction even though written acceptance was re-
quired. Id.
7 See Mackie v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 308, 310 (1975).
3' See Brief for Appellant at 34, Mackie v. Commissioner, 545 F.2d 883 (4th Cir. 1976).
I.R.C. § 7805(a) authorizes the Commissioner to issue revenue rulings dealing with the
IRS's interpretation of specific code sections. CHOMMIE, supra note 13, § 6 at 13-14. Revenue
Rulings do not have the effect of law, but are persuasive interpretations of code sections. See
Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 688, 696 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
418 U.S. 1 (1974); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 1968);
Gearhart v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Va. 1967). The ruling is subject to further
modification by subsequent legislation, court decisions, regulations, and rulings. 1976-1 C.B.
iii.
1o See note 36 supra.
" Neither the Commissioner's brief nor the legislative history of § 2056, the marital
deduction, indicate that there is a distinction between acceptance of statutorily created
1978]
